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THE CONSTITUTIONAL PROBLEM OF
NONDEBTOR RELEASES IN BANKRUPTCY
Adam J. Levitin*
In recent years, nondebtor releases have become a common feature of
big-case Chapter 11 bankruptcy practice. Nondebtor releases involve the
release of creditor claims against third-party nondebtors pursuant to a
bankruptcy plan confirmation order. Some nondebtor releases are
consensual, meaning that they are done with the assent of the releasing
creditor, but some are not.
This Essay argues that all nonconsensual nondebtor releases in
bankruptcy are unconstitutional. The constitutional infirmities of nondebtor
releases are layered:
•
•
•

all nondebtor releases—consensual and nonconsensual—are
outside the scope of Congress’s authority under an original
understanding of the Bankruptcy Clause;
all nonconsensual nondebtor releases are inconsistent with due
process’s requirement of an adjudication; and
all releases of claims that have not yet ripened into actual litigation
or that do not involve sufficiently immediate and real disputes are
outside the scope of Article III jurisdiction.

These layered constitutional restrictions do not preclude all nondebtor
releases. Consensual releases of ripened claims are still possible pursuant
to the organic powers of federal courts. In light of the concern about
constitutional abuses, however, courts should apply strict scrutiny when
reviewing the adequacy of consent and when determining whether there is
federal subject-matter jurisdiction.
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INTRODUCTION
Over the past two decades, nondebtor releases have become a routine
feature of big-case Chapter 11 practice.1 They are often viewed as an
essential tool in addressing mass torts in bankruptcy and are viewed by many
Chapter 11 practitioners as a useful deal lubricant. And they are
unconstitutional.
Nondebtor releases come in two varieties: consensual and nonconsensual.
A consensual release is simply another name for a settlement of a creditor’s
claim against a nondebtor. Such a release need occur in bankruptcy only
when it involves not just a creditor’s claim against a nondebtor, but also
property of the bankruptcy estate—effectively functioning as a three-party
settlement.2 Otherwise, the creditor and the nondebtor are free to enter into
their own private, bilateral settlement outside of court.
Nonconsensual nondebtor releases are a different story. Because such
releases are nonconsensual—i.e., they are imposed on the creditor—they
cannot, by definition, occur in private, bilateral settlements that require
mutual assent. Instead, they can come into existence solely by force of court
order, specifically a bankruptcy plan confirmation order. This Essay argues
that all nonconsensual nondebtor releases—including those entered in
1. See, e.g., Patterson v. Mahwah Bergen Retail Grp., Inc., 636 B.R. 641, 654–55 (Bankr.
E.D. Va. 2022) (noting the “ubiquity of third-party releases”); In re Aegean Marine Petroleum
Network Inc., 599 B.R. 717, 726 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019) (“Almost every proposed Chapter
11 Plan that I receive includes proposed releases.”); In re FirstEnergy Sols. Corp., 606 B.R.
720, 737 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio 2019) (“The Court takes notice that this is far from the only
pending bankruptcy case in which broad nonconsensual third-party releases of nondebtors are
being sought.”).
2. Bankruptcy law requires court approval of the use, sale, or lease of property of the
estate outside of the ordinary course of business. 11 U.S.C. § 363(b). Almost all settlements
will be outside of the ordinary course of business. Moreover, Federal Rule of Bankruptcy
Procedure 9019 requires court approval of settlements with the bankruptcy estate. FED. R.
BANKR. P. 9019.

2022]

NONDEBTOR RELEASES IN BANKRUPTCY

431

asbestos bankruptcy cases under § 524(g) of the U.S. Bankruptcy Code3—
are illegal.
There are three possible fonts of authority for nondebtor releases of any
sort in bankruptcy: statutory authorization by Congress, the common
law–making powers of federal courts, or some general penumbra of equity
powers of the bankruptcy courts. The U.S. Constitution precludes each one
of these possible bases of authority for nonconsensual releases. Congress
lacks authority under the Bankruptcy Clause to authorize all manner of
nondebtor releases, and the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause prohibits
Congress from enacting—and the courts from entering—nonconsensual
nondebtor releases. What’s more, federal courts lack Article III jurisdiction
to enter most nondebtor releases.4 These limitations preclude most, but not
all, nondebtor releases. Consensual releases of creditors’ ripened claims
against a nondebtor may still lie within the organic powers of federal courts
when the property of the bankruptcy estate is involved. Table 1 summarizes
these layered constitutional arguments.
Table 1: Constitutional Limitations on Nondebtor Releases

Nonconsensual
Releases

Consensual
Releases

Release Pursuant
to Congressional
Authorization

Release Under Federal
Courts’ Organic Powers

•

Outside scope of
Bankruptcy Clause

•

Inconsistent with due
process

•

Inconsistent with
Due Process Clause

•

Outside scope of
Bankruptcy Clause

•

Allowed, but limited by
Article III to releases of
ripened claims

No court has squarely addressed these issues yet.5 Instead, existing
jurisprudence addresses peripheral issues premised on the assumption that
nondebtor releases are allowed in some circumstances, such as whether a
non–Article III court can enter a nonconsensual nondebtor release6 or what

3. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g).
4. Federal courts also lack statutory subject-matter jurisdiction for releases of unripened
claims. See infra note 56.
5. But see In re Aegean Marine, 599 B.R. at 723–25 (noting incompatibility of
nonconsensual nondebtor releases with due process while noting that precedent in some
circuits contemplates releases in certain circumstances).
6. See, e.g., Lynch v. Lapidem Ltd. (In re Kirwan Offs. S.À.R.L.), 592 B.R. 489, 503
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018); In re Millennium Lab Holdings II, LLC, 945 F.3d 126, 140–44 (3d
Cir. 2019).
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sort of notice is required.7 While some courts have found statutory authority
for nondebtor releases to be lacking (other than in the asbestos context,
pursuant to a specific provision of the Bankruptcy Code),8 no court has
addressed the constitutional authority for nondebtor releases. Instead,
virtually all of the court rulings that have authorized nonconsensual
nondebtor releases have done so without any consideration of their
constitutionality.9 Accordingly, the argument here is derived from my own
7. See, e.g., MacArthur Co. v. Johns-Manville Corp. (In re Johns-Manville Corp.), 837
F.2d 89, 94 (2d Cir. 1988); In re Le Centre on Fourth, LLC, 17 F.4th 1326, 1334 (11th Cir.
2021); Patterson v. Mahwah Bergen Retail Grp., Inc., 636 B.R. 641, 687–88 (Bankr. E.D. Va.
2022) (noting that the insufficiency of notice of releases violated due process).
8. See In re Landsing Diversified Props.-II v. First Nat’l Bank & Tr. Co. (In re W. Real
Est. Fund, Inc.), 922 F.2d 592, 600 (10th Cir. 1991) (holding discharging liability of a third
party to a bankruptcy proceeding to be improper); Feld v. Zale Corp. (In re Zale Corp.), 62
F.3d 746, 760 (5th Cir. 1995) (“[W]e must overturn a § 105 injunction if it effectively
discharges a nondebtor.”); Bank of N.Y. Tr. Co. v. Off. Unsecured Creditors’ Comm. (In re
Pac. Lumber Co.), 584 F.3d 229, 252 (5th Cir. 2009) (“In a variety of contexts, this court has
held that Section 524(e) only releases the debtor, not co-liable third parties.”). Matters are
more complex in the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. The court has three times
refused to approve nondebtor releases. Underhill v. Royal, 769 F.2d 1426, 1432 (9th Cir.
1985); Am. Hardwoods, Inc. v. Deutsche Credit Corp. (In re Am. Hardwoods, Inc.), 885 F.2d
621, 626 (9th Cir. 1989); Resorts Int’l, Inc. v. Lowenschuss (In re Lowenschuss), 67 F.3d
1394, 1401 (9th Cir. 1995). Yet it has more recently permitted narrow exculpation of
post-petition acts by parties related to the plan approval process without repudiating those
earlier precedents. Blixseth v. Credit Suisse, 961 F.3d 1074, 1081–82 (9th Cir. 2020).
9. See, e.g., In re Johns-Manville Corp., 837 F.2d at 93–94 (affirming the district court’s
decision to affirm the bankruptcy court’s order enjoining claims against the debtor’s insurers
because “the insurance settlement/injunction arrangement was essential . . . to a workable
reorganization”); Menard-Sanford v. Mabey (In re A.H. Robins Co.), 880 F.2d 694, 701–02
(4th Cir. 1989) (affirming the district court’s decision to enjoin claims against third-party
nondebtors because allowing these suits would “defeat” the reorganization plan); Gillman v.
Cont’l Airlines (In re Cont’l Airlines), 203 F.3d 203, 212–13, 217 (3d Cir. 2000) (recognizing
that the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the Second and Fourth Circuits have upheld nondebtor
releases in “extraordinary cases” and holding that “the Bankruptcy Court and District Court
[in this case] lacked a sufficient evidentiary and legal basis to authorize the release and
permanent injunction of Plaintiffs’ claims under any of the standards adopted by courts that
have evaluated non-debtor releases and permanent injunctions”); Class Five Nev. Claimants
v. Dow Corning Corp. (In re Dow Corning Corp.), 280 F.3d 648, 658 (6th Cir. 2002)
(following “those circuits that have held that enjoining a non-consenting creditor’s claim is
only appropriate in ‘unusual circumstances’”); In re Combustion Eng’g, Inc., 391 F.3d 190,
236–38, 237 n.50 (3d Cir. 2004) (distinguishing cases involving asbestos-related claims and
claims under 11 U.S.C. § 524(g) from the claims in In re A.H. Robins Co., In re Dow Corning
Corp., and SEC v. Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp., Inc. (In re Drexel Burnham Lambert Grp.,
Inc.), 960 F.2d 285 (2d Cir. 1992), and vacating the order enjoining claimants of the
nondebtors); Deutsche Bank AG v. Metromedia Fiber Network, Inc. (In re Metromedia Fiber
Network, Inc.), 416 F.3d 136, 141 (2d Cir. 2005) (holding an appeal to be equitably moot but
noting in dicta that “[w]hile none of our cases explains when a nondebtor release is ‘important’
to a debtor’s plan, it is clear that such a release is proper only in rare cases”); Airadigm
Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC (In re Airadigm Commc’ns, Inc.), 519 F.3d 640, 657 (7th Cir. 2008)
(holding that bankruptcy courts are permitted “to release third parties from liability to
participating creditors if the release is ‘appropriate’ and not inconsistent with any provision of
the bankruptcy code”); In re Ingersoll, Inc., 562 F.3d 856, 865 (7th Cir. 2009) (upholding a
nondebtor release because the release was an “essential component” of the bankruptcy plan
under the “unique circumstances of this case”); Behrmann v. Nat’l Heritage Found., Inc., 663
F.3d 704, 711 (4th Cir. 2011) (concluding that bankruptcy courts can authorize nondebtor
releases “where circumstances warrant”); Nat’l Heritage Found., Inc. v. Highbourne Found.,
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application of various constitutional provisions, as well as of bankruptcy
court and U.S. Supreme Court precedents in other contexts, to the question
of nondebtor releases.10
I am hardly the first to suggest that nonconsensual nondebtor releases are
unconstitutional, although commentators have pointed to a range of
constitutional infirmities. Two decades ago, Professor Thomas E. Plank
raised both Bankruptcy Clause and Due Process Clause concerns in the
context of an article focused on the extra-statutory lawmaking authority of
federal courts in bankruptcy.11 More recently, the U.S. Department of Justice
raised the Due Process Clause as a basis for challenging the confirmation of
Purdue Pharma’s bankruptcy plan.12 Professor Ralph Brubaker has argued
that nondebtor releases violate the separation of powers principle embodied
in the prohibition on general, federal common law–making in Erie Railroad
Co. v. Tompkins,13 and Professor Brubaker, joined by other scholars as amici
curiae in the Purdue Pharma bankruptcy, has also argued that the
nonconsensual releases of certain claims (namely legal, as opposed to
equitable claims) violate the Seventh Amendment’s right to a jury trial.14
More recently, Judge Michael E. Wiles of the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the
760 F.3d 344, 351–52 (4th Cir. 2014) (holding that a debtor must “demonstrate that it faces
exceptional circumstances justifying the enforcement of” a nondebtor release and that to
“obtain approval of a non-debtor release . . . a debtor must provide adequate factual support
to show that the circumstances warrant such exceptional relief”); (SE Prop. Holdings, LLC v.
Seaside Eng’g & Surveying, Inc. (In re Seaside Eng’g & Surveying, Inc.), 780 F.3d 1070,
1078–79 (11th Cir. 2015) (holding that a nondebtor release or bar order “should be reserved
for those unusual cases in which such an order is necessary for the success of the
reorganization, and only in situations in which such an order is fair and equitable under all the
facts and circumstances”); In re Millennium Lab Holdings II, 945 F.3d at 137–40 (finding no
constitutional issue with a bankruptcy judge’s jurisdiction to issue third-party releases when
the releases are “integral” to the debtor’s restructuring); Blixseth, 961 F.3d at 1081–82
(permitting narrow exculpation of post-petition acts by parties related to the plan approval
process); In re Le Centre on Fourth, 17 F.4th at 1334 (finding notice for nondebtor release
sufficed for due process purposes).
10. I have made these arguments in a somewhat different form in an amicus curiae brief.
Amicus Curiae Brief of Professor Adam J. Levitin at 5–24, In re Purdue Pharma L.P.,
No. 22-110 (2d Cir. Mar. 18, 2022), ECF No. 625.
11. Thomas E. Plank, The Erie Doctrine and Bankruptcy, 79 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 633,
674–75 (2004) [hereinafter Plank, The Erie Doctrine and Bankruptcy] (concluding that all
nondebtor releases are outside the scope of the Bankruptcy Clause); Thomas E. Plank,
Bankruptcy and Federalism, 71 FORDHAM L. REV. 1063, 1091–92 (2002) [hereinafter Plank,
Bankruptcy and Federalism] (describing the Bankruptcy Clause as containing a
“non-expropriation principle” that limits bankruptcy law from going beyond adjustment of the
debtor-creditor relationship); see also Sergio Campos & Samir D. Parikh, Due Process
Alignment in Mass Restructurings, 91 FORDHAM L. REV. 325 (2022) (acknowledging
bankruptcy’s due process infirmities and proposing changes to minimize the risk of future
victims unwinding settlements).
12. Page Proof Brief for Appellee U.S. Trustee William K. Harrington at 77–84,
In re Purdue Pharma L.P., No. 22-110 (2d Cir. Mar. 18, 2022), ECF No. 558.
13. 304 U.S. 64 (1938); see Ralph Brubaker, Mandatory Aggregation of Mass Tort
Litigation in Bankruptcy, 131 YALE L.J.F. 960, 967–81 (2022). This point is also implicit in
Plank, The Erie Doctrine and Bankruptcy, supra note 11, at 670–76.
14. Amici Curiae Brief of Bankruptcy Law Professors Ralph Brubaker, George
W. Kuney, and Bruce A. Markell in Support of Appellants at 29–30, In re Purdue Pharma
L.P., No. 22-110 (2d Cir. Mar. 18, 2022), ECF No. 603.
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Southern District of New York has observed that nonconsensual nondebtor
releases, while allowed in “extraordinary cases where a particular release is
essential and integral to the reorganization itself,” are inconsistent with the
requirements of subject-matter and personal jurisdiction, as well as with the
Due Process Clause.15
This Essay’s contribution is an argument that the Constitution precludes
most—but not all—nondebtor releases. Departing from previous work, it
lays out the core constitutional authority argument in a concise and
comprehensive fashion, rather than as an ancillary observation in work
focused on different questions. In particular, it probes the original meaning
of the Bankruptcy Clause using different sources than those used by
Professor Plank to understand the scope of Congress’s power to legislate the
relationships between creditors and nondebtors. The Essay also advances a
novel argument about the way in which the Article III jurisdiction of federal
courts precludes releases of creditors’ claims against nondebtors that have
not yet ripened sufficiently to support immediate litigation.
The Essay has a Gallic division. Part I addresses the power of Congress
to legislate on the topic of nondebtor releases. It begins with a discussion of
the extent of the Bankruptcy Clause to adjust relationships between creditors
and nondebtors. It then turns to the further limitations on nonconsensual
releases imposed by the Fifth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.
Part II addresses the power of the federal courts to enter orders approving
nondebtor releases. It starts with the question of whether there is Article III
jurisdiction over the issues covered by nondebtor releases. It argues that,
separate from Bankruptcy Clause and Due Process Clause issues, there is
Article III jurisdiction over only a subset of releases, namely those where
there is an actual case or controversy. A case or controversy requires either
actual, pending litigation or sufficient grounds to maintain a declaratory
judgment action16—namely, proof by the plaintiff that there is an immediate
and real injury or threat of future injury caused by the defendants,17 such as
a reasonable apprehension of suit18 (not just the hypothetical possibility of
15. In re Aegean Marine Petroleum Network, Inc., 599 B.R. 717, 723–26 (Bankr.
S.D.N.Y. 2019).
16. See Shell Oil Co. v. Amoco Corp., 970 F.2d 885, 887–88 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (defining a
“controversy” in the context of the Declaratory Judgment Act); Aetna Life Ins. Co. v.
Haworth, 300 U.S. 227, 240 (1937) (noting that the phrase “cases of actual controversy” in
the Declaratory Judgment Act refers to the type of “cases” and “controversies” that are
justiciable under Article III); see also MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118,
126–27 (2007) (reaffirming Aetna Life’s interpretation of the Declaratory Judgment Act).
17. See MedImmune, 549 U.S. at 127 (announcing a totality-of-the-circumstances test for
the existence of an “actual controversy” for purposes of declaratory judgment); Prasco, LLC
v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 537 F.3d 1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2008) (interpreting MedImmune as
requiring “real and immediate injury or threat of future injury that is caused by the
defendants”). Virtually all of the jurisprudence on what constitutes an “actual controversy”
for purposes of seeking declaratory judgment exists in the patent law context, raising questions
of its application more broadly.
18. Caraco Pharm. Lab’ys, Ltd. v. Forest Lab’ys, Inc., 527 F.3d 1278, 1290–91 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (noting that reasonable apprehension of being sued is a way of satisfying the
MedImmune totality-of-the-circumstances test).
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future litigation).
Next, it addresses the application of the Fifth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause and argues that the clause overrides any
organic power of federal courts—whether as part of equal powers or federal
common law–making—to authorize nonconsensual nondebtor releases.
Part III considers the implications of the unconstitutionality of
nonconsensual nondebtor releases for consensual releases. It argues that the
constitutional concerns surrounding nondebtor releases necessitate a higher
threshold of scrutiny for the existence of consent and for certain procedural
steps required at a bare minimum to ensure meaningful consent.
In this Essay, I refer solely to “the federal courts,” rather than “the
bankruptcy court.” There is a separate constitutional issue about what
powers bankruptcy judges—non–Article III judges—can exercise,19 but for
the purposes of the questions I consider here, it is irrelevant. The powers and
jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court are entirely derivative of those of the
federal district courts. There is no constitutional requirement for the
existence of bankruptcy courts. Bankruptcy cases are technically filed in the
federal district court and referred to the bankruptcy court on a standing
reference order,20 but the district court may always “withdraw the reference”
and hear the case itself. Accordingly, the powers being considered here are
those of the federal district court, which will be either coterminal with or
greater than those of the bankruptcy court.
I. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON CONGRESSIONAL AUTHORITY
FOR NONDEBTOR RELEASES
A. The Limited Scope of the Bankruptcy Clause
The sole font of authority for bankruptcy law in the United States is the
Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution. It provides that “[t]he Congress shall
have Power . . . [t]o establish . . . uniform Laws on the subject of
Bankruptcies throughout the United States.”21 While the Bankruptcy Clause
does not spell out the content of what such uniform laws might be, when
interpreting the clause, the Supreme Court tends to focus on its original
meaning.22
An original understanding of the Bankruptcy Clause necessarily precludes
nonconsensual nondebtor releases. There is no evidence for uses of
nonconsensual nondebtor releases before the unsuccessful attempts in the

19. See, e.g., Lynch v. Lapidem Ltd. (In re Kirwan Offs. S.À.R.L.), 592 B.R. 489, 503
(Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2018); In re Millennium Lab Holdings II, LLC, 945 F.3d 126, 140–44 (3d
Cir. 2019).
20. 28 U.S.C. §§ 157(a), 1334.
21. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
22. See Allen v. Cooper, 140 S. Ct. 994, 1002–03 (2020) (discussing the scope of
bankruptcy jurisdiction “at the Founding”); Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 362,
370 (2006) (“It is appropriate to presume that the Framers of the Constitution were familiar
with the contemporary legal context when they adopted the Bankruptcy Clause . . . .”).
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1930s.23 The practice only began to become accepted by some courts
following the confirmation order on the Johns-Manville Chapter 11 plan in
1986.
The concept of a nonconsensual nondebtor release in bankruptcy would
have been incomprehensible to the Framers. As one scholar noted, the
“‘subject of Bankruptcies’ in the Bankruptcy Clause is limited to the
adjustment of the relationship between an insolvent debtor and [the debtor’s]
creditors.”24 Likewise, as another scholar explained, the Bankruptcy Clause
is not a limitless source of authority for courts to authorize any action that
might benefit the debtor’s financial condition: “For example, though the
chief liability of the bankrupt is thought to be his wife, the bankruptcy court
cannot strike at the root of his financial troubles by granting him a divorce—
and it is unlikely that Congress, under the Bankruptcy Clause, could
authorize the court to do so.”25
How the Framers would have understood the Bankruptcy Clause may be
gleaned from the provisions of English bankruptcy law in 1789, from
Blackstone’s Commentaries, and from the first American bankruptcy statute,
the Bankruptcy Act of 1800,26 which was “a faithful transcript of the English
statutes.”27 What is clear from these sources is that bankruptcy law, as
understood in the Anglo-American world in the eighteenth century,
contained four features relevant to the instant issue:
(1) the law applied solely to the debtor, who was required to have
committed a defined act of bankruptcy;28
(2) all of the debtor’s assets were required to be made available for
distribution to creditors;29

23. See, e.g., Weber v. Diversey Bldg. Corp. (In re Diversey Bldg. Corp.), 86 F.2d 456,
457–58 (7th Cir. 1936) (district court lacked power to release nondebtor guarantor under a
bankruptcy plan); In re Nine N. Church St., Inc., 82 F.2d 186, 188–89 (2d Cir. 1936) (district
court lacked power to enjoin suits against nondebtor guarantor). In Stoll v. Gottlieb, 305 U.S.
165 (1938), for example, the Supreme Court upheld a challenge to a plan that included a
nondebtor release but did so on res judicata grounds and assumed that the bankruptcy court
lacked subject-matter jurisdiction to grant the nondebtor release. Id. at 171. Notably, no
reported cases prior to In re Johns-Manville involved an attempt to release a nondebtor party
other than a guarantor, and even In re Johns-Manville was primarily about the release of
insurers—that is, parties that agreed to indemnify the debtor—rather than the releases of
parties for their direct liability.
24. Plank, Bankruptcy and Federalism, supra note 11, at 1089.
25. Alfred Hill, The Erie Doctrine in Bankruptcy, 66 HARV. L. REV. 1013, 1037–38
(1953).
26. Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (repealed 1803).
27. F. REGIS NOEL, A HISTORY OF THE BANKRUPTCY LAW 124 (1919).
28. See, e.g., 2 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *477–79; Act of Apr. 4, 1800 § 1.
Today, the filing of a voluntary bankruptcy petition functions as the “act of bankruptcy.”
See Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, § 11, 14 Stat. 517, 521 (repealed 1878) (filing of voluntary
bankruptcy petition is deemed an act of bankruptcy).
29. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 4, 1800 § 5 (entirety of assets); id. § 13 (debts owed to the
debtor); id. § 14 (concealed property); id. § 17 (fraudulently conveyed assets).
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(3)

creditors had extraordinary rights of discovery against the debtor in
order to ferret out concealed assets;30 and
(4) the debtor—and solely the debtor—was able to obtain a discharge
at the end of the process.31
The fourth point is the necessary implication of the first three. Bankruptcy
comes with extraordinary burdens—transparency and making available all
assets to creditors. Those burdens fall solely on the debtor. Accordingly, it
is only the debtor that is freed from the debt upon passing through the ordeal.
This is the bankruptcy bargain—discharge (and a fresh start) in exchange for
full surrender of current assets.
Even from the first days of the Republic, limits of the scope of this bargain
were clearly articulated. The primary form of business organization in the
early Republic (besides the ubiquitous sole proprietorship) was the
partnership.32 This was not the statutory limited liability partnership
common today, but a general partnership in which partners were jointly liable
for all the partnership’s debts.33 There is no closer sort of business
relationship than that which arises from this joint liability. And yet, the
Bankruptcy Act of 1800 expressly provided that—contrary to the traditional
common-law rule34—if the debtor was a partner in a partnership, the
discharge of the debtor would have no effect on the joint liability of the
debtor’s partners for partnership debts.35 Similar provisos also appear in the
Bankruptcy Act of 1841,36 the Bankruptcy Act of 1867,37 and the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898.38

30. See, e.g., BLACKSTONE, supra note 28, at 482 (“The brankrupt [sic], upon this
examination, is bound upon pain of death to make a full discovery of all his estate . . . .”); Act
of Apr. 4, 1800 § 18 (submission to examination by creditors); id. § 19 (creditors’ right to
search all of the bankrupt’s property, including by breaking doors and locks); id. § 22 (access
to debtor’s books and records). No spousal privilege was admitted regarding bankrupts.
BLACKSTONE, supra note 28, at 481; Act of Apr. 4, 1800 § 24. The examination was so
searching that American law even paid bounties to those who discovered concealed property
of the debtor. See id. § 26.
31. See, e.g., Act of Apr. 4, 1800 § 34; 5 Geo. 2, c. 30, § 7 (1732) (Eng.).
32. Frederick G. Kempin, Jr., Limited Liability in Historical Perspective, 4 AM. BUS. L.
ASS’N BULL. 11, 14 (1960).
33. See id. at 16 n.25 (noting that the first American limited partnership act was only
enacted in 1822).
34. Ralph Brubaker, An Incipient Backlash Against Nondebtor Releases? (Part I):
The “Necessary to Reorganization” Fallacy, BANKR. L. LETTER, Feb. 2022, at 1, 5.
35. Act of Apr. 4, 1800 § 34; see also Tucker v. Oxley, 9 U.S. (5 Cranch) 34, 37, 40 (1809)
(discussing provision); Sleech’s Case, 1 Mer. 539 (Ch. 1816) (Eng.) (discussing provision).
36. Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, § 4, 5 Stat. 440, 443–44 (repealed 1843).
37. Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176, § 33, 14 Stat. 517, 533 (repealed 1878) (“[N]o discharge
granted under this act shall release, discharge, or affect, or discharge any person liable for the
same debt for or with the bankruptcy, either as a partner, joint contractor, indorser, surety, or
otherwise.”); see also id. § 36 (in bankruptcy of partnership, each partner’s discharge is
independent). The Supreme Court interpreted section 33 of the act as not preventing creditors
from obtaining a post-discharge judgment against the debtor in order to execute on the debtor’s
guarantors. Hill v. Harding, 130 U.S. 699, 703–04 (1889).
38. Act of July 1, 1898, ch. 541, § 16, 30 Stat. 544, 550 (repealed 1978) (noting that
discharge of a debtor does not affect the liability of a codebtor, guarantor, or surety).
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Although it might be argued that such provisos were necessary because it
was not self-evident that the Bankruptcy Clause was limited to a discharge
of the debtor, the more plausible reading is that these were precatory
provisions intended to preclude any possible argument that the debtor’s
partner could benefit from the bankruptcy. Thus, William Cooke’s 1785
English treatise, A Compendious System of the Bankrupt Laws, did not even
discuss the possibility of a discharge for a nonbankrupt partner in the
treatise’s section on partners of the bankrupt, as it seems that the issue had
not arisen in any reported English case.39 Notably, however, Cooke’s treatise
observed that “allowing the [discharge] certificate of a bankrupt will not
discharge [the] sureties” of the bankrupt.40 In other words, English
bankruptcy law, at the time of the Founding, did not contemplate a discharge
for nondebtors, even those who were co-liable with the debtor.
In short, bankruptcy relief as understood by the Framers—and indeed
universally prior to the 1980s—would have been limited solely to the debtor
and would have been premised on submission to a searching and invasive
examination, as well as the surrender of all the debtor’s assets. The Framers
would not have been able to conceive of a bankruptcy resulting in the forced
release of creditors’ claims against nondebtors. Those nondebtors could not
get a release of liability through the bankruptcy process because those
nondebtors had not themselves committed acts of bankruptcy, submitted
themselves to examination, and made all their assets available to creditors.
The fundamental element of bankruptcy law—the discharge of debts—has
always been premised on a party’s submission to the jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy process and its substantial burdens.
This original understanding of the Bankruptcy Clause indicates that
Congress lacks the constitutional power to authorize any releases—whether
consensual or nonconsensual—of nondebtors’ direct liability through the
bankruptcy process.41 Any reading of the Bankruptcy Clause that does not
limit the scope of Congress’s power to provide relief to the debtor risks
transforming the Bankruptcy Clause from a narrow and particular power of
Congress into the equivalent of a second Necessary and Proper or Commerce
Clause that would allow Congress the free-ranging power to restructure all
manner of economic and property relationships as it sees fit. Given the scant
discussion of bankruptcy in the constitutional debates, it is hard to believe
that the Framers hid a general power of economic regulation within the
modest trappings of the Bankruptcy Clause. Accordingly, it does not matter
which statutory provision one points to as a purported source of authority for
39. See WILLIAM COOKE, A COMPENDIOUS SYSTEM OF THE BANKRUPT LAWS (1786).
40. Id. at 343–44.
41. A consensual release does not in fact depend on its inclusion in a bankruptcy plan, but
its inclusion in a plan is permitted because it is simply an “appropriate provision not
inconsistent with the applicable provisions” of the Bankruptcy Code. See 11 U.S.C.
§ 1123(b)(6). Whether the Bankruptcy Clause authorizes Congress to permit the release of
nondebtors’ derivative liability—such as is provided for by 11 U.S.C. § 524(g)—and what
liability is in fact derivative are separate questions. See Travelers Indem. Co. v. Bailey, 557
U.S. 137 (2009) (limiting nondebtor release under § 524(g) to claims of derivative liability).
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nondebtor releases because any such provision—including those under
Bankruptcy Code § 524(g)’s asbestos-specific regime42—would appear to be
beyond the scope of Congress’s constitutional power. Notably, as addressed
in Part II, the lack of congressional authority to provide for nondebtor
releases by statute does not preclude nondebtor releases under the organic
powers of the federal courts, but the authorization of such releases is subject
to a different analysis.
B. Fifth Amendment Limitations on the Bankruptcy Clause
The Bankruptcy Clause would appear to preclude congressional
authorization of any nondebtor releases, but even if it does not, the power of
Congress to adjust liabilities under the Bankruptcy Clause is also constrained
by the Fifth Amendment’s guaranty of due process of law and prohibition on
the taking of private property without just compensation.43
The Due Process Clause does not preclude consensual releases of
nondebtors. Nonconsensual nondebtor releases, however, offend due
process for two reasons44: First, such nonconsensual releases are undertaken
without opportunity for an adjudication of the creditors’ claims against
nondebtors. Second, the releases are nonconsensual deprivations of property.
At the core of due process is notice and the opportunity for an adjudication
of a claim on its merits before a competent tribunal. As the Supreme Court
has noted:
Many controversies have raged about the cryptic and abstract words of the
Due Process Clause but there can be no doubt that at a minimum they
require that deprivation of life, liberty or property by adjudication be
preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of
the case.45

To be sure, the particulars of the adjudication may vary based on the
circumstances involved.46 Nevertheless, “[t]he essence of due process is the
requirement that ‘a person in jeopardy of serious loss [be given] notice of the
case against him and opportunity to meet it.’”47 Notice alone is not sufficient

42. 11 U.S.C. § 524(g).
43. See Hill, supra note 25, at 1038 (“[T]he bankruptcy power is restricted . . . by other
provisions in the Constitution, such as the Due Process Clause . . . .”).
44. Two additional, but potentially surmountable, due process issues also exist with
nondebtor releases: the adequacy of notice provided to creditors of the releases and the
adequacy of representation of future claimants in the bankruptcy process.
45. Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Tr. Co., 339 U.S. 306, 313 (1950); see also Fuentes
v. Shevin, 407 U.S. 67, 80–81 (1972) (requiring notice and opportunity to be heard prior to
replevin of goods); Sniadach v. Fam. Fin. Corp., 395 U.S. 337, 340–42 (1969) (requiring
notice and an opportunity to be heard prior to wage garnishment order).
46. See, e.g., Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 348–49 (1976).
47. Id. (second alteration in original) (quoting Joint Anti-Fascist Comm. v. McGrath, 341
U.S. 123, 171–72 (1951) (Frankfurter, J., concurring)).
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due process.48 Due process also prohibits parties from being deprived of
property without getting their proverbial “day in court” in some form.49
Nonconsensual nondebtor releases are inconsistent with such due process
requirements. Creditors who have direct claims against nondebtors have
property interests: their direct claims are “choses in action.” Like other types
of property interests, these choses in action are protected under the Due
Process Clause.50 Moreover, these choses in action also clearly have value:
nondebtors’ contribution to a plan, including their own granting of mutual
releases, is contingent on their release from the direct claims.
The confirmation order for a plan with a nonconsensual nondebtor release
effectuates the forced release of creditors’ covered direct claims against
nondebtors. This happens without any opportunity for adjudication of
individual direct claims whatsoever.
Creditors compelled into
nonconsensual nondebtor releases never get their chance at a “day in court”
vis-à-vis the nondebtor. At most, they get to appear in the bankruptcy case,
but the released claims are not claims against the debtor, but against a party
over which the court might not even have jurisdiction.
There is no way to reconcile this with the demands of due process.
Creditors’ direct claims have never been adjudicated in any fashion by any
court. Even if a court had jurisdiction over these direct claims (addressed
below), no complaint for these direct claims has been filed before a court, no
answer has been provided, no motion practice has occurred nor discovery
been taken, and no facts have been found by a trier of fact regarding these
direct claims. Simply put, there is nothing before the court to adjudicate, so
no adjudication is possible.

48. See City of New York v. N.Y., N.H. & H.R. Co., 344 U.S. 293, 297 (1953) (noting it
is a “basic principle of justice . . . that a reasonable opportunity to be heard must precede
judicial denial of a party’s claimed rights”).
49. See Martin v. Wilks, 490 U.S. 755, 761–62, 768 (1989) (noting the “deep-rooted
historic tradition that everyone should have his own day in court” and that “[a] voluntary
settlement . . . cannot possibly settle, voluntarily or otherwise, the conflicting claims of [those]
who do not join in the agreement” (internal quotation marks omitted)). The Fifth Amendment
Due Process Clause’s “day in court” requirement stands separate and apart from the Fifth
Amendment’s prohibition on takings without just compensation. Even if there has been an
adjudication, the creditor must also be paid just compensation for its claim. What “just
compensation” means in the context of bankruptcy is beyond the scope of this Essay, but
presumably, just compensation takes the form of a bankruptcy claim with a face amount equal
to the value of the property taken, rather than a distribution in bankruptcy equal to the value
of the property taken. If so, the prohibition on takings without just compensation could likely
be satisfied if a creditor were to receive—specifically on account of the release of the
nondebtor—an appropriately extra or larger claim in the bankruptcy. This would, however,
require a finding by the court regarding the extra distribution to the creditor being on account
of the release.
50. See, e.g., Tulsa Pro. Collection Servs., Inc. v. Pope, 485 U.S. 478, 485 (1988) (“Little
doubt remains that [a cause of action] is property protected by the Fourteenth Amendment.”);
Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Shutts, 472 U.S. 797, 807 (1985) (“[A] chose in action is a
constitutionally recognized property interest possessed by each of the plaintiffs.”); Logan v.
Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422, 428 (1982) (“[A] cause of action is a species of property
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause.”); Mullane, 339 U.S. at 313
(recognizing cause of action as property interest).
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Nor could a Chapter 11 plan confirmation process function as an
adjudication. A court’s findings of fact in a plan confirmation order all relate
to whether the debtors have met the statutory requirements for Chapter 11
plan confirmation. A bankruptcy court has no basis for making findings of
fact regarding the merits of individual creditors’ direct claims. Likewise, the
percentages of creditors supporting a plan are irrelevant—due process rights
are not subject to majority vote. The Chapter 11 plan confirmation
procedures are not themselves any sort of due process for the direct claims.
Accordingly, nondebtor releases violate the Fifth Amendment because they
deprive creditors of property without due process of law.51
Nonconsensual nondebtor releases also violate the Fifth Amendment’s
Due Process Clause for another reason: they are nonconsensual. The
Supreme Court has made clear that in the context of a monetary damages
class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23(b)(3), due process
requires, at a minimum, the opportunity to opt out of a class.52 Bankruptcy
is not meant to be a back door for bypassing the constitutional strictures that
govern class actions.
To be sure, a class action involving a limited fund under Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure Rule 23(b)(1) does not require an opt-out opportunity, but
there is no limited fund in the case of nondebtor releases. The debtor in
bankruptcy is, of course, a classic limited fund situation—a major function
of bankruptcy law is to provide an orderly mechanism for dividing a limited
fund. But the nondebtor that benefits from a release is not a limited fund.
The nondebtor has never had to open its books for inspection under penalty
of law. When nondebtor releases are approved, there is never a court finding
sufficient to establish the existence of a limited fund, which would require
not just a finding about the extent of the nondebtor’s assets, but also a finding
that all those assets are being committed to satisfying creditors’ claims. To
51. Nondebtor releases are also uncompensated takings. See In re Aegean Marine
Petroleum Network, Inc., 599 B.R. 717, 725–26 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019) (noting that
“[i]nvoluntary releases also result in a taking of property without a formal hearing to ensure
that the affected party has received proper compensation”). The Fifth Amendment prohibits
takings of property for public purposes without just compensation. U.S. CONST. amend. V.
Nondebtor releases force creditors to surrender property—a chose in action—without any
determination that they have received just compensation. Indeed, the findings of fact that
typically support a release do not distinguish whether the distribution to a creditor is on
account of the release or on account of its claim against the debtor. Notably, even if there
were just compensation, that would only satisfy the takings issue; the due process issue would
remain even if the compensation were just.
52. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 564 U.S. 338, 363 (2011) (“In the context of a class
action predominantly for money damages we have held that absence of notice and opt out
violates due process.”); Ortiz v. Fibreboard Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 846–48 (1999) (noting the
due process problem of a mandatory class in a class action for damages). The Supreme Court
has held the same in the context of a state law class action. Shutts, 472 U.S. at 812 (“[D]ue
process requires at a minimum that an absent plaintiff be provided with an opportunity to
remove himself from the class . . . .”). Whether consent in bankruptcy would require an opt-in
rather than an opt-out right is an issue that has divided lower courts. See generally Dorothy
Coco, Third-Party Bankruptcy Releases: An Analysis of Consent Through the Lenses of Due
Process and Contract Law, 88 FORDHAM L. REV. 231 (2019) (discussing various approaches
to consent in the context of nondebtor releases).
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the extent that a nondebtor is not committing all its assets to satisfy creditors’
claims, the “fund” is not in fact limited, as additional funds remain available
to satisfy creditors’ claims. It does not matter that those additional funds are
themselves finite because they are not actually threatened with depletion.
Until the actual limitations of the “fund”—that is, the nondebtor’s ability to
pay, not its willingness to pay—are at issue, there is no economically limited
fund.
The Due Process Clause applies to bankruptcy cases just as it does to class
actions, and it requires that any settlement of claims against nondebtors be
consensual. All nonconsensual nondebtor releases violate the Fifth
Amendment.
II. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITS ON COURTS’ AUTHORITY TO ENTER
NONCONSENSUAL NONDEBTOR RELEASES
A. Article III Jurisdiction “Case or Controversy” Requirement
Article III extends the federal judicial power solely to “cases” and
“controversies.”53 It is axiomatic that a case or controversy requires either
that litigation has actually been brought or there is an immediate and real
injury or threat of future injury that would permit a court to issue a
declaratory judgment about a dispute.54 Typically, this second circumstance
requires the party seeking a declaratory judgment to prove a reasonable
apprehension of being sued.55 Unless one of these two conditions has been
met, there is nothing for the court to adjudicate.
The requirement of actual litigation or injury sufficient for a declaratory
judgment action makes sense because it requires the parties to be able to
articulate the claim to be adjudicated with sufficient definiteness. Without
that, the court—and the parties—could not know what was actually being
adjudicated and whether it actually falls into the ambit of the court’s
jurisdiction. Nor could other courts determine the preclusive effect of any
judgment.
This jurisdictional limitation means that if the creditor has not yet brought
suit against the nondebtor, or if the nondebtor could not yet sustain a
declaratory judgment action because its dispute with the creditor was not
sufficiently immediate and real, federal courts lack jurisdiction to enter an
order releasing the creditor’s claim against the nondebtor because there is no

53. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2.
54. See MedImmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 127 (2007) (announcing a
totality-of-the-circumstances test for the existence of an “actual controversy” for purposes of
declaratory judgment); Prasco, LLC v. Medicis Pharm. Corp., 537 F.3d 1329, 1339 (Fed. Cir.
2008) (interpreting MedImmune as requiring “real and immediate injury or threat of future
injury that is caused by the defendants”).
55. See Caraco Pharm. Lab’ys, Ltd. v. Forest Lab’ys, Inc., 527 F.3d 1278, 1290–91 (Fed.
Cir. 2008) (noting that reasonable apprehension of being sued is a way of satisfying the
MedImmune totality-of-the-circumstances test).
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“case” or “controversy” to adjudicate.56 If a creditor merely has a potential
claim against the nondebtor, but has not yet sued or taken actions that would
threaten to harm the nondebtor (for example, perhaps demanding payment or
threatening suit), federal courts lack Article III jurisdiction to resolve that
potential claim until it ripens sufficiently to sustain a suit brought by the
claimant or a declaratory judgment action brought by nondebtor. Article III
jurisdiction would have to exist for each individual creditor affected by the
nondebtor release.
It is important to note that recognition of the limitation on federal courts’
constitutional jurisdiction to actual “cases” and “controversies” need not
affect the ability of bankruptcy law to address contingent and unmatured
claims against the debtor. The objection to a claim filed by a creditor or
scheduled by the debtor should function like a complaint for the purposes of
bringing the matter within the scope of Article III.
The implication of Article III’s limitation on federal court jurisdiction to
actual “cases” and “controversies” means that federal courts lack jurisdiction
to address creditors’ unripened claims against nondebtors, separate and apart
from the Bankruptcy Clause and Due Process Clause issues with releases.57
Federal courts have, at most, jurisdiction over a very limited subset of
creditor claims against nondebtors, namely those where a suit is pending or
could be pending at the time of the entry of a plan confirmation order. They
do not have jurisdiction over future claims that might be brought against
nondebtors.
56. A similar problem exists under the statute on bankruptcy subject-matter jurisdiction.
That statute provides that “the district courts shall have original but not exclusive jurisdiction
of all civil proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in or related to cases under title 11.”
28 U.S.C. § 1334(b). Any subject-matter jurisdiction over creditors’ claims against
nondebtors would likely be under the third “related to” prong. The statute on bankruptcy
subject-matter jurisdiction, however, limits jurisdiction to “civil proceedings . . . related to
cases under title 11.” Id. Even if a creditor’s claim against a nondebtor were related to the
bankruptcy case, there is still no federal subject-matter jurisdiction unless there is an actual
pending suit—a “civil proceeding[]”—brought by the creditor against the nondebtor. Id.
Indeed, one court has observed: “[W]hen third-party releases are proposed there is rarely any
‘proceeding’ pending at all. Instead, the court is asked to exercise power over a potential
claim for which no actual proceeding exists.” In re Aegean Marine Petroleum Network, Inc.,
599 B.R. 717, 723 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. 2019). The “civil proceeding” constraint on statutory
jurisdiction is more restrictive than the Article III “case” or “controversy” requirement.
“Controversy” is broad enough to encompass situations where a suit is reasonably anticipated
and can create the basis for a party seeking a declaratory judgment. See supra note 16 and
accompanying text. The use of the term “proceeding” and the statutory requirement of a “civil
proceeding” restrict subject-matter jurisdiction to actual cases (and would further exclude
criminal cases). Notably, when the Supreme Court addressed the scope of bankruptcy “related
to” subject-matter jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1334(b), it was in the context of pending
civil litigation, so the “civil proceedings” limitation never arose. Celotex Corp. v. Edwards,
514 U.S. 300, 301–02 (1995) (addressing jurisdiction over execution on supersedeas bond on
judgment).
57. Professor Marcus G. Cole has argued that future claims should not be subject to
nondebtor releases on the basis of federalism concerns, the Bankruptcy Code’s requirement
of equal treatment with present claimants, and distorted incentives for voting. Marcus G. Cole,
A Calculus Without Consent: Mass Tort Bankruptcies, Future Claimants, and the Problem of
Third-Party Nondebtor “Discharge,” 84 IOWA L. REV. 753, 778–95 (1999).
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B. Fifth Amendment Limitations on the Courts’ Organic Powers
Even when Article III jurisdiction exists, federal courts must still have
some source of authority to issue nondebtor releases. Part I of this Essay
explained why the Bankruptcy Code cannot be the source of such authority—
the Bankruptcy Clause and the Due Process Clause each independently
preclude Congress from authorizing nonconsensual nondebtor releases.
Federal courts, however, have organic, extra-statutory lawmaking powers,
although the nature and scope of such powers is often a matter of some
controversy. Disputes about the nature and ambit of these powers are
irrelevant in this context, however. No matter whether the federal courts’
organic powers are characterized as rooted in federal common law–making
or equity powers,58 they are all necessarily bounded by the Fifth Amendment,
which is a limitation on the entire federal government, not merely on
Congress. Just as the Fifth Amendment precludes Congress from legislating
a process whereby creditors can be deprived of their property rights against
nondebtors without an adjudication, so too does it prevent courts from doing
this on their own. Nonconsensual nondebtor releases are beyond the power
of federal courts.
The Fifth Amendment does not preclude consensual releases of nondebtors
as part of a bankruptcy plan, however. Such releases are potentially within
the power of federal courts. Substantively, however, the inclusion of
consensual releases in a bankruptcy plan does little more than create a
convenient procedural vehicle for the aggregate solicitation and tabulation of
releases that are individually possible on a private, bilateral basis outside of
bankruptcy.
Whether federal courts’ organic powers extend so far as to cover the actual
consensual releases contemplated is likely a case-specific issue, as such
releases would also have to have a sufficient connection to the bankruptcy
case for the bankruptcy court to have statutory subject-matter jurisdiction,
but if the release implicates the property of the bankruptcy estate, such
jurisdiction would surely exist.
III. THE NEED FOR STRICT SCRUTINY OVER NONDEBTOR RELEASES
A. Where Nondebtor Releases May Still Be Constitutional
To put together the limitations distilled by the previous parts of this Essay,
although Congress lacks the power to authorize any sort of nondebtor release,
the federal courts have the power to authorize consensual releases of ripened
claims of creditors against nondebtors as part of a bankruptcy plan.59

58. See, e.g., Adam J. Levitin, Toward a Federal Common Law of Bankruptcy: Judicial
Lawmaking in a Statutory Regime, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1 (2006) (arguing that federal courts’
exercise of organic powers in bankruptcy is best conceived of as rooted in federal common
law–making, rather than in powers of equity).
59. See supra Table 1.
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Although nonconsensual nondebtor releases are beyond the constitutional
power of federal courts, consensual releases—bilateral settlements between
creditors and nondebtors—are permitted, although there must still be a
subject-matter basis for a federal court to hear the case, such as the
involvement of the property of the bankruptcy estate, the estate’s own claims,
or the existence of indemnification or contribution claims on the estate by
nondebtors.
Notably, previous scholarship arguing that nondebtor releases are beyond
the organic lawmaking power of federal courts has focused on nonconsensual
releases, rather than on the possibility of limited authority for consensual
releases.60 Whether federal courts’ organic powers do in fact extend so far
is a question beyond the scope of this Essay.
B. Strict Scrutiny over Consent and Jurisdiction
The unconstitutionality of nonconsensual nondebtor releases places great
pressure on proponents of those releases—and courts that see such releases
as a useful tool for facilitating majoritarian reorganization deals—to cast
releases as consensual and to claim jurisdiction based on the releases
involving the interests of the bankruptcy estate.
The constitutional concerns involved with nondebtor releases should
mandate a higher level of scrutiny over such supposedly consensual releases.
In terms of consent, this means undertaking serious scrutiny of the adequacy
of notice and the form of consent.61 Particularly in the case of mass tort
plaintiffs, opt-in consent should be preferred to opt-out consent. Creditors
are not required to vote in Chapter 11, and their inaction is hardly evidence
of affirmative consent. Waiver of constitutional rights should not be implied.
To be sure, there is no higher standard of scrutiny for consent in the context
of class actions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23(b), which
allow opting out. The class action opt-out situation may be distinguished
from consent to the nondebtor releases in a bankruptcy plan because the class
action consent is consent on a stand-alone issue, whereas the bankruptcy
release is always in the context of a vote on a plan. The combination of the
plan solicitation and the release solicitation means that the plan solicitation
is likely to overshadow the release. While there might be a separate consent
solicitation on the ballot, the creditor has received an extensive disclosure
statement about the debtor and its plan, and the release of nondebtors will be
addressed only in the bowels of that disclosure statement, rather than being
the subject of a freestanding disclosure and solicitation. Procedurally,
bundling the plan solicitation with the release solicitation makes creditor
comprehension and consent to the release more suspect.
Courts should also be wary of arguments that the estate’s interests are
implicated because of the released nondebtor’s indemnification and
60. See Plank, The Erie Doctrine and Bankruptcy, supra note 11, at 670–76; Brubaker,
supra note 13.
61. See generally Plank, The Erie Doctrine and Bankruptcy, supra note 11, at 676–77
n.220 (discussing problem of deemed consent).
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contribution claims against the estate.62 Such arguments are key for
establishing statutory subject-matter jurisdiction, but courts should be
suspicious of arguments based on indemnification and contribution claims
because such claims should properly be disallowed under 11 U.S.C.
§ 502(e)(1) in most cases, might also be subject to equitable subordination
under 11 U.S.C. § 510(c), and would likely be dischargeable in any event.
The number and magnitude of claims against the estate does not implicate
the property of the estate—only its division. Nonetheless, if the debtor in
possession has not sought to disallow or subordinate such claims, it should
not be allowed to use the continued vitality of such claims as a basis for
bringing a settlement within the jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court.
Similarly, courts should be leery of claims to jurisdiction if such
jurisdiction is claimed over a creditor’s settlement with a nondebtor because
the settlement is a package deal that settles both the creditor’s claims and the
debtor’s own claims against the nondebtor. Unless the debtor’s own claims
truly cannot be separated from those of the creditors, this sort of arrangement
should not be allowed because it provides a ready fig leaf for entering
settlements when Article III jurisdiction is lacking.
For example, a nondebtor might propose making a substantial contribution
to a trust for the benefit of particular creditors, but only in exchange for the
debtor indemnifying it against certain claims by those creditors. Although
such an arrangement might increase the funding available through the
bankruptcy for the creditors, there is no guarantee that it will maximize the
creditors’ total recoveries, both in and outside of bankruptcy. More
critically, the court should decline to exercise jurisdiction in such an
obviously manufactured context. The transactions relating to the nondebtor
release itself cannot themselves give rise to subject-matter jurisdiction.
CONCLUSION
Nondebtor releases have long been one of the most controversial practices
under Chapter 11. Yet there has been curiously little scrutiny of their
underlying constitutionality. Instead, the legal debate has focused on
whether they are authorized by the Bankruptcy Code or federal courts’
organic powers, without consideration of constitutional limits on their scope.
This Essay has presented the case that courts lack the power to order
nonconsensual releases of nondebtors, and that even most consensual
releases lack validity. The particular provisions of the Bankruptcy Code and
federal courts’ equity and common law–making powers are simply irrelevant
to the question of nonconsensual nondebtor releases, which are anathema to
the Bankruptcy Clause, the Due Process Clause, and, in many cases, Article
III jurisdiction. Any court that would authorize a nonconsensual nondebtor
release should consider whether it has the constitutional power to do so.
62. See Ralph Brubaker, Bankruptcy Injunctions and Complex Litigation: A Critical
Reappraisal of Non-Debtor Releases in Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 1997 U. ILL. L. REV.
959, 1002–09 (arguing that nondebtor releases cannot be justified based on the possibility of
indemnification or contribution claims against the estate by the nondebtor).

